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This thesis utilizes Extended Air Defense
Simulation (EADSIM) , a government -owned computer model, to
determine the optimum stationing of an AEGIS ship in an
Anti-Theater Ballistic Missile (ATBM) role defending two
cities. The conclusions stated depend upon the validity of
that model. The AEGIS ship's command being unsure of enemy-
launch sites and target intentions, the geometrically worst-
case enemy launch points against the cities were modeled.
Numerous potential positions from which an AEGIS ship could
actively defend the cities with its Surface-to-Air missiles
were assessed by simulation. Those positions which appeared
advantageous were additionally evaluated in order to obtain
greater confidence in the results of the ship's defense from
those assigned stations. In order to aid in visualization
of the results, expected TBM hits on the cities, and raid
attrition by the AEGIS ship, were displayed on scatter,
three-dimensional surface, and contour plots, from which the





A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 1
B. BACKGROUND 2
C. HISTORY 3
D. CURRENT THREAT 5




2. Active Defense . . .7
II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 12
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION 12
B. DESCRIPTION OF A HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM 12
C. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 13
1. Enemy Capabilities 14
2. Friendly Capabilities 16
D. PROBLEM ASSUMPTIONS 17
E. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS 18
III. METHODOLOGY 19
A. SIMULATION DESCRIPTION 19
1. Model Configuration 20
2. Rulesets 22





4. Firing Doctrine 25
5. TBM Flight 2 6
B. HARDWARE DESCRIPTION 27
C. DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT 27
IV. ANALYSIS 2 9
A. PRELIMINARY STATIONING RESULTS 29
B. MONTE CARLO EVALUATION OF STATIONING RESULTS . .30
C. MODEL WEAKNESSES 3 7
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 39
A. NEAR-LAND STATIONING CONCERNS 3 9
B. DISTANT STATIONING CONCERNS 4
C. FURTHER AREAS OF STUDY 4
1. Weapon Requirements 4
2. Firing Doctrines for Anti-TBM Defense. . . .41
3. Multi-ship Stationing Plans 42
4. Joint Action 42
APPENDIX A. RESULTS OF SIMULATION RUNS 4 5
APPENDIX B. RESULTS OF MONTE CARLO TRIALS OF PREFERRED
SHIP POSITIONS 47
APPENDIX C. CALCULATION OF TBM HIT PROBABILITIES 52
LIST OF REFERENCES 53
BIBLIOGRAPHY 54
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 55
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to thank many of the faculty and
staff of the Naval Postgraduate School who showed an
interest in this topic and assisted me in overcoming
computing systems, software, and theory in an attempt to
tackle this problem.
Particularly, I'd like to thank Mike McCann and Matthew
Koebbe of the NPS Computer Center's Visualization Laboratory
for their assistance with the UNIX operating system and
using Silicon Graphics computers. I received invaluable
help interacting with EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SIMULATION from
Dan Yates of Teledyne Brown Engineering and Tom Dalm and
Todd Gandy of CAS, Inc.
Lastly, I wish to thank my thesis advisors, Professor
Donald P. Gaver and LCDR Mary S. Russo, and second reader,
Professor Patricia A. Jacobs, for their much-tested
patience. They dedicated a great deal of time to give me an
appreciation of doing meaningful analysis.
VI
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PROBLEM: A recommendation for the advantageous positioning
of an AEGIS ship to intercept Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM)
threats in a given scenario is required by the decisionmaker
and is the focus of this study.
The coalition's defense against SCUD missiles during
Operation DESERT STORM was largely ineffective, and diverted
resources originally intended for other combat missions.
During that operation, thirty percent of the Allies' theater
tactical aircraft assets was shifted from battlefield air
interdiction missions to locating and attacking SCUD launch
vehicles. In spite of this effort, there was not one
confirmed destruction of a TBM launch vehicle by a tactical
aircraft. In addition, post-war analysis of the active TBM
defense campaign by the PATRIOT missile system revealed that
interception rates were far lower than those first claimed.
This example strongly compels modern armed forces to develop
systems and tactics capable of effectively countering the
TBM threat
.
Not only a.:e theater ballistic missiles capable of
delivering high-explosive warheads, but also nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons, termed "weapons of mass
destruction"
. With potential adversaries having this
pernicious capability, a system and tactics must be in place
to defeat all incoming TBM threats with high probability,
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since sustaining even a small nuclear or biological hit on a
city or military site is unacceptable. The Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) has directed that Army
and Navy adopt a two-tiered approach for the active defense
mission. For the Navy, the lower-tier provides area
protection of debarkation ports, coastal airfields, and
expeditionary forces ashore. The intercepting weapon used
in this phase should be a dual-purpose surface-to-air
missile (SAM) able to engage TBMs and aircraft. The Navy is
experimenting with the SM-2 Block IV A missile which is
designed to meet those requirements.
The upper-tier missile will give the defender a long-
range exo-atmospheric capability against TBMs. This will
protect military forces, critic"'1 assets and population
centers. Intercepts at long-range and high altitude will
minimize collateral damage of intercept debris on the ground
and provide a greater defended area footprint . With
technical development, testing, and evaluation well underway
and heavily funded by Congress, an equally important concern
is where to place AEGIS ships to best defend critical areas
and objectives.
SOLUTION METHODOLOGY: This thesis addresses only the active
defense pillar of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) through the
use and positioning of an AEGIS ship for sea-based theater
missile defense of two industrial cities in Southern Italy
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from Libyan TBM strikes. An AEGIS ship with an upper and
lower-tier surface-to-air missile capability in countering a
raid of ground- launched 1500 km range TBMs was modeled in
Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM) . EADSIM is a
medium- fidelity analytic simulation model of air and missile
warfare, including TMD . By modeling the sea-based AEGIS
sensor and the SAMs with expected lethal envelopes and
probabilities of kill (Pk ) , trials were conducted to simulate
the effects of ship position for maximizing TBM intercepts
in this scenario.
SOLUTION: After one initial trial with 61 ship positions
that could defend both cities, 33 closely met the measure of
effectiveness requirement of two or fewer TBMs impacting a
city out of a 12 -TBM strike with high probability. This
smaller group of 33 was then subjected to the same attack
scenario nine additional times in Monte Carlo trials to
obtain a more accurate expected number and variance of TBM
hits on the cities. From these trials it was estimated that
11 positions met the measure of effectiveness of two or less
TBM impacts in either city with an estimated probability of
90-percent and higher. The results were graphed in contour
and three-dimensional scatter plots to enhance visualization




A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
As a result of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of
1972 and detente with the Soviet Union, the U.S. scrapped
all fielded ballistic missile interceptors. However the
threat of the SCUD Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) to
coalition forces and Israel during OPERATION DESERT
SHIELD/STORM compelled rapid in- theater changes to the U.S.
Army's PATRIOT system. This provided the U.S. the
capability of intercepting SCUDs in the terminal phase of
flight. Although spectacular SCUD vs. PATRIOT duels were
broadcast live during DESERT STORM, AEGIS ships in the
Arabian (Persian) Gulf were tracking the TBMs from hundreds
of miles away, but had no missile capable of intercepting
those TBMs. [Ref . l:p. 56] By changing only 7 6 lines of the
1.1 million lines of computer code in the AEGIS' AN/SPY-
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radar and Weapon Control System (WCS), the ships have gained
the capability to track the TBMs. [Ref. 2:p. 3]
Surface-to-Air missile interceptors are being developed
to be deployed in the late 1990' s, and the process of
procuring a Joint Army-Navy missile is ongoing. With
technical development, testing, and evaluation well underway
and heavily funded by Congress, an equally important concern
is where to place these weapons platforms to best defend
critical areas and objectives. Actively countering a TBM by
properly stationing a capable AEGIS ship for a given
scenario is the focus of this study.
B . BACKGROUND
Coalition experience in Operation DESERT STORM in
combatting the SCUD Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) was
ineffective and seriously jeopardized the cohesiveness of
the coalition. In spite of a well-conducted air campaign
using a thoroughly compiled target list in complete air
superiority, an estimated 90 SCUDs were launched against
coalition forces in Saudi Arabia and at Israel.
To keep the Coalition together, thirty percent of the
theater's allied tactical aircraft assets were shifted from
battlefield air interdiction missions supporting the land
campaign, to locating and attacking SCUD launch vehicles.
Yet there was not one confirmed destruction of a TBM launch
vehicle by a tactical aircraft. Additionally, post-war
analysis of the active TBM defense by the PATRIOT missile
system revealed interception rates far below what was first
claimed. Because of their shoddy construction and the
modifications necessary to achieve an increased range, Iraqi
SCUDs were unbalanced in their downward flight. Their
erratic, corkscrewing descent caused many TBMs to break into
fragments and self-destruct, inadvertently confusing the
ground radars. Those that didn't break up were particularly
difficult to intercept due to their unintentionally
effective, maneuvering, final flight path.
C. HISTORY
Modern missile technology traces its roots back to the
early days of gunpowder and incendiary weapons . The war
rocket, a short-range artillery weapon, was developed
shortly after the discovery of gunpowder in the 14th
century. Militaries on the Indian subcontinent were using
war rockets by the end of the 1300' s. Over the next 400
years, their use spread among the Chinese, Indian, and Arab
armies, military forces of the same nations that continue to
develop these weapons at present.
Today's modern ballistic missiles are the descendants
of the German V-l and V-2 programs of World War II. During
that war, the German Air Force fielded the V-l missile.
Launched from a catapult, it was the first of what are now
termed "cruise missiles". Powered by a pulse jet, the V-l
had a range of about 24 0km (150 miles) . The V-l campaign
started in June, 1944, against London and other major
cities. Nazi Germany fired about 20,000 missiles against
allied cities and military staging areas. Great Britain's
Royal Air Force radar and the air defense system shot down
approximately 4,000 V-l's.
In September, 1944, the German Army began using a
newer, more formidable weapon, the V-2. The V-2 was a
single-stage, liquid-fueled ballistic missile equipped with
an inertial guidance system. This weapon was mobile and
launched from railroad flatcars. It carried a warhead of
750kg of high explosives and had a 50 percent greater range
than the V-l (350km) . In approximately 3,200 firings no V-
2's were ever intercepted in flight . Even more disturbing,
in spite of an aggressive allied campaign to destroy the
dreaded missiles on the ground by bombing, there was never a
confirmed kill of a V-l or V-2 on the ground . [Ref . 3:p. 5]
That WWII lesson foreshadowed DESERT STORM events.
Immediately after WWII, the US and USSR salvaged V-l
and V-2 missiles and gave refuge to their scientists and
engineers for employment in US and USSR national programs.
Though the cruise missile was abandoned in the US after the
Regulus Missile Program fSSR developed the STYX family
of cruise missiles, which have proliferated in original,
duplicate, and improved versions throughout the world.
These were the first modern cruise missiles to be used in
Post-WWII combat (Egypt against Israel, 1967).
The US and USSR used captured V-2s in the earliest
phases of their own cruise and ballistic missile programs.
A direct descendant of the original 1940 's German design,
the Soviet SCUD is the most-common ballistic missile in the
world and has been identified in the weapons arsenals of at
least 16 countries.
D. CURRENT THREAT
Currently, more than 20 countries have ballistic
missiles. According to intelligence projections, nearly 40
will acquire or produce their own missiles by the end of the
decade. The majority of the missiles are relatively short-
ranged (120-600km) , but, considering the geographic
constraints, 300-500km is sufficient range to influence and
damage cities and military targets in the Third World. [Ref
.
4:p. 65] Countries such as North Korea, Argentina, and
China could soon be producing missiles in the 1500-3000km
range. [Ref. 5:p. 53] There have been some reports of an
Iraqi "Al-Abed" system which has traveled over 1900km(1200
miles)
.
Beyond increasing missile ranges, the additional threat
of improved guidance systems using the US's Global
Positioning System(GPS) or the former Soviet Union's GLONASS
is disquieting. Incorporation of such technology could
bring much improved tactical accuracy to a presently
inaccurate (SCUD Circular Error Probable is approximately
1000 yards) weapon. Most distressing to the major powers is
the increasing availability of nuclear, chemical, and
biological warheads. Grouped together in a category termed
"Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
"
, these warheads mated
with long-range TBMs would give Third-World countries
strategic dominance in their regions. This capability in
the hands of potential adversaries demands a weapon system
and tactics development effort focused on defeat of all
incoming TBM threats with high probability. The
consequences of sustaining even a small nuclear or
biological hit on a city or military site is unacceptable.
E. OPTIONS TO COUNTER THE THREAT
There are various methods and options to defend against
the Theater Ballistic Missile threat. These are defined by
the Joint Chief of Staff in the TMD Mission Need Statement
as "The Four Pillars of TMD". These are:
Passive Defense : enhancement of the survivability of
friendly forces and assets.
Battle Management /Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence (BM/C3I) : effective communications, command
and control of TMD operations and data flow.
Attack Operations (Counterf orce) : destruction of the
enemy's capability to launch missiles.
Active Defense : intercepting the TBM in flight so as to
destroy the ballistic missile and negate the warhead.
1. Counterforce
The first two pillars of defense are a part of any
modern military operation. However, the last two pillars
require further explanation. The Counterforce option has
three windows of opportunity.
The first is the fixed infrastructure where the
missiles, warheads, and transporter erector launchers (TELs)
are designed, produced, and stored. The second is the
forward support logistics infrastructure where the enemy
moves his TBM systems prior to hostilities. Last is the
launch phase, when the missile and warhead on the TEL are
moved to the firing point and launched. After the poor
showing by coalition forces in the SCUD-hunting campaign,
there has been a renewed emphasis on attempting to improve
counterforce capability through better sensors, weapons, and
BM/C3I.
The Counterforce option is very difficult. Tactical
camouflage and concealment, combined with the mobility and
size of the TELs, makes finding the TBMs before launch
challenging. Regardless of those challenges, destroying
WMDs before launch in the counterforce phase is the most
highly desired option and will net the greatest payoff. But
when viewed historically, it will probably not achieve the
expected attrition rates of a well-structured active
defense. Rather, it complements the active defense option
by restraining enemy launch plans and compelling the enemy
to launch hurriedly, thereby degrading his launch efforts
and his ability to conduct a successful attack.
2 . Active Defense
Since the trajectory of a ballistic missile can be
divided into three phases, there are also three windows of
opportunity in Active Defense: boost and post-boost,
midcourse, and terminal.
The boost phase refers to the early portion of missile
flight, when the missile booster engine burns and thrusts
the vehicle to terminal velocity. The rocket motor burns
for about 10 to 20 percent of the TBM's total flight time.
The post-boost phase is the period immediately after booster
engine burnout, which initiates the release of the TBM's
warhead (s) into the exo-atmosphere, perhaps 100km above the
earth's surface. The midcourse phase refers to the
relatively long period when warheads coast along their
ballistic paths. The terminal phase is the final portion of
the flight, when the warheads re-enter the atmosphere and
proceed downward to their intended targets.
Each phase of a TBM's flight represents a unique
interception opportunity. Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) has
the greatest benefit since the missile is destroyed early in
its flight before multiple warheads and decoys can be
expelled. Additionally, TBMs intercepted in the boost phase
fall on enemy-held land, which is especially important
should WMDs be used. Logically, the TBM is still connected
to its booster rocket and thus is large, bright, slow-
moving, and therefore relatively easy to kill in this phase.
Attrition in this phase means fewer TBMs must be intercepted
down range in proximity to the defended area.
BPI is difficult because it requires considerable
sensor capability to acquire the TBMs. The short time span
from TBM launch to the end of the boost phase, perhaps only
as long as 80 seconds, mandates that the interceptor be
nearly over the enemy, or be capable of reaching the
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boosting TBM extremely quickly. Currently the U.S. Air
Force is conducting research and analysis on Boost Phase
Intercept in ATBM defense. Ideas being considered are
ultra-high altitude manned, or possibly unmanned, aircraft
with laser-like weapons. This was the ideal regime in which
spaced-based sensors and weapons ( "Brilliant Eyes/Pebbles")
were designed. However, with the considerable reduction of
the Soviet threat and a shrinking defense budget, the
present administration has decreed that there will be no
weapons in space
.
In the midcourse phase of its flight, the TBM follows a
ballistic path. Intercepts during this phase will be at
very high altitudes and at long ranges from the TBM's
target, thus tending to reduce collateral damage. In this
extremely high altitude environment, infrared detection and
guidance are very promising. During this phase of the TBM's
flight, however, decoys or penetration aids ( "penaids" ) are
dispensed, adding to the defender's problem of target
selection.
There are advantages to intercepting the TBM in the
terminal phase. Upon reentering the atmosphere, actual
warheads are better discriminated from decoy penaids.
Defense against TBMs in their terminal phase of flight can
also be consolidated with conventional air defense. Most
significantly, there is already a capability in this
intercept phase today. The challenges are that the
decelerating TBM may intentionally (or by poor design,
unintentionally) maneuver, leaving limited interceptor
engagement time before TBM ground impact. Even if
successfully engaged, the TBM may scatter debris over the
defended area, causing serious collateral damage.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)
directed that the Army and Navy examine the active defense
mission through a two-tiered approach. For the Navy, the
lower-tier weapon provides area protection of debarkation
ports, coastal airfields, and expeditionary forces ashore.
The Army's upgraded PATRIOT system provides an example of
this baseline proficiency. The intercepting weapon used in
this phase should be a dual-purpose surface-to-air
missile (SAM) able to engage TBMs and aircraft. The Navy
plans fielding the SM-2 Block IV A missile in 1998 to meet
these requirements.
The upper-tier missile will give the defender a long-
range exo-atmospheric ability against TBMs to protect
military forces, critical assets, and population centers.
Intercepts at long range and high altitude will minimize
collateral damage on the ground and provide a greater
defended area footprint. While the Army is developing the
Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, the Navy
is pursuing a Lightweight Exo-atmospheric Projectile (LEAP)
.
Under constrained funding, only one of the systems will
likely be selected for procurement. In combination with the
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lower-tier weapons, the anticipated synergism of the systems
will allow multiple interception possibilities, providing
defense-in-depth from TBMs
.
To summarize, TBMs cannot be countered by merely one
simple technical solution (PATRIOT, AEGIS, Corps SAM,
BPI . .
. ) , but must employ a mixture of these capabilities.
Closely coordinated joint and combined efforts using
existing and future systems will be necessary to provide
adequate defense. The best answer is a balance of effective
attack operations, comprehensive active operations,
practical passive defenses, and a robust C3I and
surveillance capability. Lastly, the US should be able to
include allied cooperation into this effort, since the
outlook is that coalition warfare will be encouraged in
future military actions.
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II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section a specific problem concerning the
defense against TBM attack of a vital objective (an allied
nation's cities) is addressed. An AEGIS ship is to be
positioned in an advantageous (optimal) way so as to counter
an enemy long-range TBM attack on two strategic cities.
The study methodology is computer simulation using
Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM) . The simulation
results will be analyzed using statistical techniques and
presented in response surface methodology. The objective is
to station a single AEGIS Ant i -TBM) ship to minimize the
chance of a TBM missile targeted at one of the cities from
penetrating the defense.
B. DESCRIPTION OF A HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM
The United States and her NATO allies are greatly
concerned with the threat of ballistic missile launches from
Libya. Long-range TBMs launched from sites in that country
can strike several cities in Europe. This scenario also
12
features a long overwater flight, and thus is appropriate
and timely for this study. Figure 1 depicts possible flight
paths
.
FIGURE 1. Geography of Example TBM Scenario
C. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
To avenge the loss of face suffered during the Reagan-
Bush years and Western military raids on its State-sponsored
terrorist training camps in the desert, Libya can be
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expected to fire advanced, Russian-built TBM's, which have
been modified for greater range, at targets in Europe. In
this study the targets are presumed to be the populous
industrial Italian cities of Rome and Naples.
The attacks will originate from two separate launch
sites, the locations of which are unknown to allied forces.
Should a TBM launch occur, the TBM flight path can be
"backplotted" accurately to its area of origin through a
combination of sensors. The sites can then be counter-
targeted in an attempt to destroy the launch vehicles, thus
reducing future launches.
1. Enemy Capabilities
Libya has procured, from a previously Soviet -supplied
country, a transportable theater ballistic missile with a
range of 1500 km. Known as the "Al Kaddafi", the missile
has a 500 kg warhead and has the potential to be a weapon of
mass destruction (WMD) . The missile is launched from a
Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) . The TEL can transport a
TBM on paved and graded dirt roads and can remain
untargetable in "hide sites" until just before use.
Locating mobile TBM launching systems before hostilities
begin is exceedingly difficult. Only 45 minutes are
required for launch preparation and ten minutes are needed
to get the launcher underway after firing. Libya intends to
use this system as a terrorist weapon to compel Western
14
governments to cease violating Libyan borders, presumably in
defense of their own national security.
The Libyans have a capable air force by third world
standards. But it would be foolish to send a manned air
strike over 1000km to attack a Western European nation.
Even a well -planned strike would give the defending country
adequate time to intercept and engage the attack with
aircraft and SAMs . Because of flight path and speed, a TBM
raid allows for little warning time, and countering the raid
is very challenging.
The Libyans have utilized TBMs before. In 1986, they
fired TBMs at US forces on the island of Lampedusa in the
Sicilian Straits in response to US air strikes on Libyan
targets. Although the missiles impacted the island they
missed their mark, but the attack signalled a new threat
with which to contend.
Using Iraqi TBM operations in the Gulf War as a
reference, it is expected that the Libyan attack will
consist of 12 TBMs in a raid, since the Libyan's have only
12 launch vehicles. The 12 -TBM raid will consist of six
missiles fired at each of the target cities, Rome and
Naples. This firing scheme might produce more TBM hits
since the defenders must spread out their resources. Iraqi
firings were observed to be scattered between one and six
minutes apart. In the scenario to be studied here, the
Libyan firings occur every 30 seconds because of better
15
command and control and also to make the scenario more
challenging for the ship.
2 . Friendly capabilities
Suppose an AEGIS ship capable of intercepting TBMs is
stationed in the Central Mediterranean. With spaced-based
cueing it is expected to get a first detection of the
inbound TBM at approximately 400 miles from the ship and
missile intercept at 250 miles with the upper- tier weapon.
The upper-tier weapon is designed solely for use against
TBMs; therefore it is built to operate in altitudes between
100,000 and 250,000 feet. Flying in the exo-atmosphere, it
has an average velocity of 2000 meters/sec, and has a
single- shot probability of kill against a TBM of
0.75(P esk=0.75) .
The ship is also armed with a dual-purpose anti-
aircraft and ant i -TBM missile. This weapon's altitude
ceiling is 100,000 feet and its range is much less than that
of the upper-tier weapon. It is slower than the upper-tier
weapon, flying at approximately Mach 3(800 meters/sec), and
also has a single-shot probability of kill of 0.75 against
TBM targets.
It is standard doctrine to shoot a salvo of two
missiles per target and evaluate the firing success after
the predicted intercept to decide whether further firings
are required for a kill. As modeled, the ship can engage a
maximum of 18 targets simultaneously.
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D. PROBLEM ASSUMPTIONS
For the purposes of this study, the following realistic
assumptions were made:
-The theater ballistic missile will have a typical
flight profile of a 1500 kilometer range missile.
-A spaced-based sensor or high altitude aircraft will
initially detect the launch of the ballistic missile and
provide a cue or alert of an expected track to the AEGIS
ship.
-The AEGIS ship, on high alert status in an operating
area at sea, will receive the track information from the
sensor and have the AN/SPY- 1 radar prepared for the earliest
possible detection of the missile.
-Should a hit be achieved by the ship-launched missile,
the TBM will be deemed destroyed or killed.
-However, if the TBM is not intercepted in its flight,
it has a 100 percent probability of hit(Ph=1.0) against its
intended target, modeling the worst case situation.
-The AEGIS ship will not be threatened by any other
air, surface, or sub-surface platforms.
-It is reasonable to assume that night or adverse
weather has no effect on either forces' operations.
-All participants modeled are operating at complete
combat readiness and no mission area degradations.
-No TBM decoys are used by the Libyan forces.
-No jamming is used to counter US air defense.
-No terminal maneuvers will be conducted by the TBMs to
evade intercepting SAMs
.
Though single ship employment is probably realistic in this
geographic and political scenario, other creative situations
in littoral waters and maritime chokepoints against stronger
countries could seriously challenge a single ship or Surface
Action Group.
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E. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
Since no flawless defense system exists, it must be
accepted that some TBMs will penetrate the AEGIS TBM
engagement zone. It is presumed that each of the cities can
absorb at most two hits . This presumption is based on the
political ramifications of the missile strikes and the
belief that disaster response activities could respond to
two impact sites in each city. The TBM hits on the cities
would seriously damage structures and start intense fires on
the ground from the residual rocket fuel. A ship position
which would allow only two or fewer missiles to impact on a




The mobile sea-based AEGIS weapon system will be
modeled with expected engagement volumes and probabilities
of kill (Pk ) . Trials will be conducted to simulate the
effects of various explanatory factors for TBM intercept in
this scenario. This scenario will be modeled using EXTENDED
AIR DEFENSE SIMULATION (EADSIM) , Version 2.07.
A. SIMULATION DESCRIPTION
EADSIM is an analytic, attack/response simulation model
of air and missile warfare. It is a mid-fidelity force-on-
force analytic model developed by Teledyne Brown
Engineering. It has been used primarily by the U.S. Army's
Space and Strategic Defense Command and Missile Command as a
low-cost, high-repetition, interim analysis capability to
evaluate architectures for improving current air defenses,
include Theater Missile Defense. 1 Each platform, e.g., a
fighter aircraft, is individually modeled, as are the
interactions among the other platforms. The simulation
models the Command and Control (C2) decision processes and
1For a complete description of the simulation, refer to:
Extended Air Defense Simulation Methodology Manual, Teledyne
Brown Engineering, Huntsville, AL, April, 1992.
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the communications among the platforms on a message-by-
message basis.
1. Model Configuration
The full analytic configuration of the model consists
of four processes:





The C3I process is the core of the model. It performs the
C2 decision and track processing, in addition to the
engagement and weapons modeling for all the platforms in the
scenario. Flight Processing controls the movement and
status of each air platform. The Detection Process models
each sensor in the scenario and determines when detection of
a platform by another platform's sensor occurs. The
Propagation process controls communication connectivity and
message transfers. This process will not be used in this
scenario because there is only one SAM site, the AEGIS ship.
The C3I process is the only one of the four run- time
processes that is event-driven, rather than time step-
driven. The C3I Process performs all the modeled battle
management functions for each platform in the scenario.




Given the environment, specific rulesets are executed
that determine the activities of the platform, including the
allocation of weapons against targets. This process also
performs engagement modeling for surface-to-air and surface-
to-surface weapons.
Surface-to-air engagement modeling allows the platform:
to search and identify targets, to choose the target most
threatening to itself or to its assets to defend, and to
assign a weapon to the threat to engage and destroy it.
Semi-active, "f ire-and-forget" , and Non-Line of Sight
missiles are modeled.
An engagement will be initiated when the target can be
intercepted by one of the ship's SAMs . All of the SAMs are
simplistically modeled as having a constant-velocity flight
in a straight line to the intercept point. (For a more
realistic simulation, a kinematically correct flyout profile
of the missile could be loaded into the data base for usage.
This would make the simulation model classified, and beyond
the scope of this study.) When a SAM reaches its target, a
"kill" or "no-kill" determination is made based on the Pk
assigned to the SAM against the target.
Surface-to-surface modeling provides for targets to be
selected and engaged by TBMs and cruise missiles. Ballistic
missiles are flown either in a depressed or a lofted
trajectory profile. Normally, the kill assessment for the
surface-to-surface weapon is a "kill" "no-kill"
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determination made by random draws based on the user-defined
Pk values for a TBM against each a target. In this
scenario, each TBM that survives its flight through the TBM
engagement zone to its destination is deemed to be a
success, since the worst-case situation is that WMDs are
used in the warheads
.
2 . Rulesets
The ruleset under which the platform is operating
determines its actions and behavior. Rulesets govern the
response of the platform being threatened and its activities
modeled in order to carry out its mission. There are a
number of different rulesets in EADSIM: Flexible SAM,
AWACS, Intelligence Fusion Post, Fighter, Airbase, etc. The
AEGIS ship will be modeled using the Flexible SAM ruleset,
which allows the si _i.p to engage aircraft or air breathing
threats (ABTs) and TBMs . There are four phases of the
Flexible SAM ruleset in operation: Target Select, Launch,
Intercept, and Reload.
a. Target Select Phase
The AEGIS ship must be actively tracking the TBM
so that a threat assessment, weapon-to-target assignment,
and launch queue construction can be performed. The TBM
will be engaged only if it threatens the AEGIS ship or a
pre-designated asset, e.g., a city, that the ship must
defend. This is based upon the predicted impact point of
the TBM. This step is performed on board the ship and uses
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the predicted TBM trajectory for intercept calculations.
The AEGIS ship is able to distinguish between aircraft and
TBMs by observing user- specif ied minimum and final TBM
assessment altitudes and the rate of change in the
altitude (climb rate) which uniquely identify a TBM. In the
model, the impact point of the TBM cannot be determined
until the threat has reached its apogee and is descending.
The priority of the threat, relative to other threats, is
based on the shortest time until the threat's impact. Thus,




The actions of the ship are controlled in the
launch phase once an engagement decision has been reached.
A launch record for the weapon to target pairing is created
and entered into the queue of launches. The delays of the
actual SAM launcher are modeled to simulate reality. Once
the SAM is fired, the missile inventory in the ship's
magazine is decremented.
c. Intercept Phase
The actual intercept event of SAM flyout and
outcome determination (kill assessment) are represented in
the Intercept Phase. The kill assessment allows for a delay
in the evaluation of the success of the engagement before
the track is either removed from the engagement file in the
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case of a kill, or rescheduled for another intercept attempt
in the event of a failure.
Several checks are executed in the intercept portion of
this phase to determine the outcome of the engagement.
Provided the firing ship and TBM are still alive in the
simulation and the TBM track is held by the firing unit, the
TBM's survival will be assessed against the SAM's
capability. If the range to the TBM is greater than the
lethal range of the weapon against it, or if the ship's
radar no longer holds the TBM, the engagement is a failure.
The target is then evaluated against the Pk of the weapon
fired at it through a random draw. If the Pk is greater
than the random draw, the engagement is a success.
d. Reload Phase
In this scenario, the reload phase is not
utilized. The ship's magazines are filled with 80 SAMs . Of
these, 40 are Upper Tier weapons, capable only against TBMs
in high altitude, and 40 Lower Tier weapons which are
available for any anti-aircraft engagements. Once these
missiles are depleted, replenishment from a pier, tender, or
other method must be sought. Replenishment of these weapons
would take the ship out of action for days; scheduling a
replacement is not considered in this thesis. This reload
feature of EADSIM would more appropriately be used in
modeling a ground-based SAM site such as a PATRIOT or HAWK
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battery, which has additional missiles available in vehicles
near the launch sites.
3 . Weapon Selection
The weapon selection process determines which weapon
will be used to intercept the threat. This process would be
used in the case of a SAM commander who has more than one
type of missile available to counter a threat. An example
could be a heterogeneous SAM battery ashore or an AEGIS ship
in tactical command of other SAM ships in defense of an area
or high-value unit. Weapons are selected for engaging
threats based on the shortest intercept time to the target
.
4. Firing Doctrine
The number of SAMs shot against a target is dependent
upon the difficulty and urgency of the engagement. For an
urgent, challenging shot against a high velocity target such
as a TBM, the primary doctrine is to launch two missiles at
each target as rapidly as the launcher is capable, and then
observe the result. Should the intercept fail, another two
missiles will be fired (SHOOT-SHOOT, LOOK, SHOOT-SHOOT)
.
Once the missile magazine is decremented to a certain level
or threshold, normally 50 percent of its full capacity of
that weapon, a secondary doctrine of one SAM per TBM (SHOOT,




The TBM is modeled as a surface-to-surface missile
with a single-stage rocket motor. It can fly two profiles,
either lofted or depressed, which are user-selected. These
profiles are accomplished through a launch iteration scheme
given the range to the intended target. The flight of the
TBM is modeled through numerical integration of three-
degrees-of -freedom(3 dof) equations of motion. The effects
of gravity and altitude-dependent atmospheric pressure are
accommodated also. It is assumed that the TBM flies along
its velocity (thrust) vector properly trimmed during its
flight.
It is conceived that the enemy, knowing the exact range
to his target from his firing position, would load his
missile with only the minimum fuel necessary to deliver it
to the target. This is termed a minimum energy trajectory.
Its purpose is to reduce the missile's probability of being
intercepted by minimizing its flight time while keeping the
trajectory higher than the depressed flight. Theoretically
this would lessen the TBMs exposure time in the lethal area
of the TBM defenses.
The simulation version used currently does not support
minimum energy trajectories. This is corrected in the
models' s next release, version 3.0. In view of current and
near-term technology, it is reasonable to assume that a
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long-range TBM would fly in a lofted trajectory. This was
the trajectory modeled for the scenario.
B. HARDWARE DESCRIPTION
EADSIM requires a powerful, but not necessarily unique,
computer system to take advantage of the graphics and data
processing attributes of the model:





In its next release, version 3.0, the model can be run
on a smaller, less-expensive, Sun Sparc2 or SparclO
workstation, provided it has a GS graphics card. Only a
moderate degradation in graphics capability of the
simulation is reported. These workstations are the Navy's
standard desktop workstations and are being acquired in
large numbers for both sea and shore activities.
C. DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT
A series of trials are run to adequately and reliably
measure the response of interest, in this case, TBM kills,
as position of the AEGIS ship is varied. Although this
scenario could be modeled more realistically as a complex
theater level wargame with thousands of platforms and
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variables, in this thesis, the AEGIS ship position will be
the factor that influences the experiment's results.
The intent of this model is to determine the best
position for the ship to produce the maximum value of the
response, e.g., maximizing AEGIS TBM kills. This design
choice was also chosen for its military applicability.
Without superb intelligence estimates of the enemy's
intentions, a commander must position his forces so as to
counter any perceived enemy action. As more information on
enemy intentions is obtained and evaluated, defending
resources are adjusted to increase their advantage against
the enemy
.
At the outset of this scenario, the only intelligence
available is that since Libya has 12 launch vehicles, Libya
has the potential to fire a maximum of 12 TBMs in a raid.
Thus the worst-case number of TBMs in flight is defined. No
other information is known by the West other than that
relations with Libya are strained and tense. As a non-
provocative precaution, an AEGIS ship is tasked to defend
Central Italian cities while conducting operations in
international waters in the Mediterranean Sea.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. PRELIMINARY STATIONING RESULTS
Using the scenario described in Chapter II (Scenario
Description, Enemy Capabilities) and the methodology-
addressed in Chapter III, one replication of the simulation
for each of 61 different geographic stationing positions (by-
latitude and longitude) to defend both cities was done. The
results of the runs are found in Appendix A. The number of
TBM hits on the cities was recorded in order to compare the
firing ship's position against the measure of effectiveness.
Knowing that a 12 -TBM raid of six TBMs at each city was
launched, a percent attrition of the raid by the AEGIS ship
for each city is calculated and appears in Appendix A, also.
Included among these defensive stations were those that were
expected not to intercept many TBMs. This was necessary in
order to show the rises in the contour and three dimensional
surface plots: the Response Surfaces. These plots enhance
visualization of the most effective AEGIS stationing
assignment areas and indicate those where the estimated





FIGURE 2. Surface Plot of Average TBM Attrition
B. MONTE CARLO EVALUATION OF STATIONING RESULTS
From this first set of trials run to obtain a
familiarity with the AEGIS ship performance, 33 of the
original positions tested as moderately satisfactory at
meeting the measure of effectiveness of two or less TBMs
surviving to impact each city. Thus, further testing was
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required on these positions to gain a more precise estimate
of expected TBM hits on the cities and their variance.
This was accomplished by evaluating the AEGIS ship in
each of those satisfactory positions through ten Monte Carlo
replications using a different random number seed for the
C3I and Detection process for each trial. Random number
seeds were drawn from a function in a HP-28C calculator.
The results of these trials are found in Appendix B.
The number of hits on each city were averaged over the
ten Monte Carlo trials of each position. This average is
the mean number of hits on the city and describes the
estimated expected number of hits on the city per TBM strike
mission (termed EXP VAL in Appendix B) . Data from these
trials was also used to calculate the sample variance of the
number of hits and standard error of the mean number of TBM
hits upon each city. The square of the standard error is
the sample variance divided by the number of replications,
which is 10 . Formulas for these calculations appear in
Appendix B
.
There were no TBM failures in flight modeled in this
study. Therefore, TBMs that did not impact the city were
evaluated as being killed by the AEGIS ship. Thus, an AEGIS
ship's probability of killing an individual TBM targeted at
a specified city is computed from the data collected from
each ship position and appears in Appendix B. An average of
the estimated AEGIS ship probabilities of a TBM kill for the
31
two cities was determined. This was used as an estimate of
the AEGIS ship probability of killing an incoming TBM
targeted against either city, or average attrition, which is
shown in Figure 2
.
The probability of an individual TBM impact on a city
was determined using the converse of the probability of it
being intercepted by an AEGIS SAM, or (l-PrTBH kill ) indexed on
the city. These probabilities are tabulated in Appendix C.
From these, the estimated probabilities of zero, one, and
two TBM hits on a city were computed. These probabilities
were calculated using a sum of the two distinct binomial
probability distributions of individual TBM hits on the
target cities, given the position of the defending ship.
The needed calculations are given below; indicates an
estimate from simulation output.
Pr(0 hits) = (1-Ph ) 6 + (1-A ) 6 (1)11Rmne "Naples
Pi {1 hit) = (1-Ph ) 6 (6Ph , ) (1-Ph t )
"Rome "Naples "Naples
(2)
+ {1-Ph ) 6 6Ph (l~Ph )iJNaples "Rome "Rome
5
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+ 6P„ (l-A. ) 5 6Ph (1-Ph ) 5 (3)





2 (1-Ph ) 4
"Naples "Ron* "Rome
Pr(2 hitsV fewer) = Pf (O'hits) +Pr (1 hit)+Pf(2 hits) (4)
These probability calculations of the number of TBM
hits to either city are tabulated in Appendix C. The
positions of these ship stationing assignments and the
expected number of TBM hits were plotted in a 3 -dimensional








































FIGURE 4. Scatter Plot of Expected TBM Hits on Naples
Of the 33 positions that were worthy of further
evaluation, 11 positions had two or fewer TBM hits upon both
of the cities with an estimated probability in excess of 90-
percent. A listing of the positions are found in Appendix
C. Maximizing the estimated probability of two or fewer
hits is the objective selected to satisfy the measure of















FIGURE 5. Surface Plot of the Estimated Probability of Two
or fewer TBM hits per city
Stationing the ship at 39.75 degrees (North) and 14.25
degrees (East) results in a estimated 98-percent probability
of destroying individual TBMs, as calculated in the last
column of Appendix B (AVE [Pr (INDIV TBM KILL)]). In ten
trials with the ship stationed at the above coordinates,
there were no. hits on Rome and only an expected 0.30 hits
per raid upon Naples. Combined with an estimated 94 -percent
probability of both cities sustaining two or fewer TBM hits;
this position clearly exceeds the measure of effectiveness
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described previously. This compares favorably with a
contour plot of the estimated AEGIS ship probabilities of a
TBM kill against individual TBMs as depicted in Figure 6
below.
LONGITUDE(EAST)
FIGURE 6. Contour Plot of AEGIS Attrition of TBMs
It accurately shows the bounds of the most effective
operating areas to position the ship. The upper right
quadrant of the plot represents the Italian coastline, and
thus is unavailable for ship stationing.
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C. MODEL WEAKNESSES
The experience gained over several months to simulate
this scenario has illuminated some weaknesses in the
simulation. First, the model was created for the U.S. Army;
hence there has been little Navy involvement in its
development. Tailoring of Army and Air Force systems were
required to approximate naval systems and operations. As
the Navy embraces EADSIM, it is recommended that a notional
AEGIS model be developed and validated by the AEGIS Program
Of f ice (PMS400) for an accurate representation of the ship's
systems
.
EADSIM requires an in-depth knowledge of C2
architectures, Anti-air Warfare (AAW) systems, and the TBM
threat. It is difficult for one person to have a thorough
background in all of these warfare disciplines. Therefore,
for the most accurate representation of a scenario, a
heterogeneous team with combined experience in various
aspects of Theater Missile Defense would be most beneficial.
Despite the use of a graphical user interface (GUI) for
data input and model operation, EADSIM is not user- friendly
from an average staff officer's perspective. Interviews
with other users throughout the country confirm this
opinion. An estimate of two to four man-months to create a
theater-level scenario with 2,000 platforms is ambitiously
optimistic unless the staff is well-practiced. A week-long
tailored training session for the author of this thesis was
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necessary in order to utilize the basic features and
generate this simple scenario. There are EADSIM user's
groups throughout the country that meet frequently. These
concerned users share their knowledge and recommend
improvements to the model to the developer and Program
Manager
.
For weapons engineers, the rather simplistic modeling
of Pk lacks fidelity. The end-game constraints or terminal
events of the SAM and TBM intercept should be more
accurately modeled to properly evaluate the interceptor's
effectiveness. More important than range, the aspect
angles, velocity, and geometry of the two missiles at
intercept are strong factors in SAM effectiveness. But the
dynamics of those constraints could be accounted for through
a lower user-defined Pk of the SAMs . This Pk would be based
upon a higher-fidelity detailed analysis using existing
engineering models designed precisely for this purpose.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of the trials demonstrates that one AEGIS
ship could defend both Rome and Naples from TBMs fired from
Libya, as the attacking and defending systems were modeled
for the scenario. It was expected that more than one AEGIS
ship would be required to provide this defense. From the
results obtained, it is recommended that the ship be
stationed in a 60 by 25 nautical mile area around 39.75
degrees (N) 14.25 degrees (E) . This provides a 1500 square
nautical mile area in which the ship may operate effectively
in the TMD role.
A. NEAR-LAND STATIONING CONCERNS
Placing a ship as close as possible to the area to be
defended could be a promising tactic provided that the
commander is certain that the city in that area is the only
one targeted by his enemy's TBMs. In this inshore position,
the AEGIS system performs best, but the inherent mobility of
a warship is lost
.
The placement of a ship close to a single area is far
from optimum, however, because at least one ship would be
required for each area defended and the debris from
successful engagements could fall on friendly, heavily-
populated ground. Unfortunately, despite a successful
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intercept, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) , could still be
effective against the target cities and population if
intercepted too close to the target
.
If there were adequate time available prior to
hostilities, upgraded PATRIOT batteries could be deployed to
the cities to defend against TBMs in the terminal phase.
This would free the ship from a constricted, limiting picket
station to a position farther out to sea. Netted with the
PATRIOT batteries, such positioning would allow more
intercepts of the TBMs through defense- in-depth.
B. DISTANT STATIONING CONCERNS
Stationing a ship farther from the city defends a much
greater area, has the potential for more kills, and allows
for debris and the harmful effects of WMDs to fall into the
sea, away from friendly territory. Distant from land, a
ship may be able to support other phases of the naval
campaign and would be free to maneuver to avoid and combat
other attacks, especially by enemy submarines that prey on
ships whose maneuvers are too predictable.
C. FURTHER AREAS OF STUDY
1. Weapon Requirements
Should the scenario described in this study be
typical of future conflicts, a requirements assessment of
interceptors to counter long-range TBMs must be studied.
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The necessary drawdown of forces and subsequent reduction of
ships will permit fewer AEGIS ships to be available for TBM
defense missions. This predicament compels the design of
more capable weapon systems to defeat TBMs, since fewer
platforms will be in the inventory.
2. Firing Doctrines for Anti-TBM Defense
With the AEGIS ship's mission to intercept only 12
TBMs in the scenario modeled, only the primary SAM firing
doctrine (described in Chapter III, Simulation Description,
Firing Doctrine) was utilized, since the ship's missile
magazine was never decremented below 50-percent. A larger
TBM raid might force a change in the firing doctrine used
and produce fewer TBM kills.
After actual test firings of the Anti-TBM missiles are
conducted, real data will be obtained on missile
performance. These data can be used with EADSIM to
investigate firing schemes so as to reach an effective
tactical employment doctrine. This simulation analysis
would reduce the great expense of numerous exercise firings,
which are destructive tests, and hence costly. Not only is
the cost of missile testing a concern from a monetary
perspective, but an effective combat firing doctrine is
important, too.
It is imperative not to overuse missile assets in
combat. An AEGIS cruiser has a maximum of 122 missile
cells (AEGIS destroyers have 96), which contain a mixture of
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Land-Attack Cruise Missiles, Anti-ship Cruise Missiles,
Ant i- Submarine Rockets, and Anti-Air Missiles; none of which
can be replenished at sea. An inport period or mooring to a
tending vessel in very calm waters must be scheduled to
effect a replenishment of missiles. So what may be a
successful firing doctrine on the first day of the "TBM
Campaign" may not be so by the third day, when the SAMs have
been expended and the ship must leave station to be
replenished. Should the TBM threat remain present , another
AEGIS ship would be required to perform this role when the
first departs its station for replenishment.
3. Multi-ship Stationing Plans
Defending a larger area, perhaps even an entire
theater against missile attack, could be modeled in EADSIM.
This would take the form of a theater-level model with
hundreds of platforms, including land-based air defenses and
enemy tactical aircraft. The simulation can model multiple
platforms in the theater air defense network. Studies in
this area could aid in determining a proper Theater Missile
Defense force structure required to astutely build for
future regional conflicts.
4. Joint Action
Outcomes of TBM scenarios will vary greatly depending
upon the geography of the land to be defended. Obviously
this would impact the sea room in which to station a ship
and the ballistic flight profile of a TBM towards its
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target. Cases in which Army PATRIOT and future Ground-
Based Interceptors (GBI) can be utilized should be modeled in
concert with AEGIS ships. In the scenario presented,
PATRIOT batteries in the targeted cities could have
intercepted the remaining TBMs that penetrated the AEGIS air
defense. Unfortunately, the cost of these advanced air
defense systems may prohibit many countries from procuring
them. Additionally, host-country politics could prevent
nations from requesting US assistance to defend their cities
from Anti-TBM sites on their own soil. This is one of the
great advantages of the sea-based system which operates
freely in international waters. However, should the ground-
based batteries be available for deployment and be accepted
in the host country, it would be the most highly-sought
arrangement to properly defend the cities through a system
of layered defenses.
With continued refinement of the simulation, more Monte
Carlo trials to reduce sampling variances, and more accurate
classified data from the sponsoring agencies on US and enemy
TBM capability, it is hoped that a more realistic response
surface for the measures of effectiveness of evaluating the
position of an AEGIS ship can be constructed. It could then
be used as a tactical decision aid to enable a warfare
commander to best allocate assets to defend against the
growing and difficult threat represented by surface-to-
43
surface ballistic missiles launched from unanticipated,
unexpected, and difficult to neutralize sources.
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APPENDIX A
RESULTS OF SIMULATION RUNS
Raid Attrition = Nr TBM hits
ci /Nr TBMs firedcitv eraid
Average = (Raid Attrition^ + Raid Attri tionNaDles ) /2p '
PQS
|






1 Lat(N) 1 Long(E) (TBM IMPACTS) Raid Attrition
1 1 Rome Naples Rome Naples
j
Average
1 40.50 12 50 2 0.67 1.00 0.83
2 40 50 12.00 1 1 083 0.83 0.83
3 40.50 I 13.00 2 0.67 1.00 0.83
4 40.50 13 50 1.00 0.83 0.92
5 40.75 13 25 1 1.00 0.83 092
6 40.75 12.75 5 0.17 1.00 0.58
7 40.75 1225 4 3 033 0.50 0.42
8 40.75 11.75 6 1.00 0.00 0.50
9 40.25
10 40 25
I 13.75 1 0.83 1.00 0.92
1325 1 0.83 1.00 0.92
11 4025 12.75 2 2 067 0.67 ! 0.67
12 40.25 1225 3 1 0.50 0.83 j 0.67
13 41.00 1250 2 1.00 067 0.83
14 4100 12.00 3 1.00 0.50 0.75
15 41.00 13.00 1 2 0.83 067 0.75
16
17
41.00 1350 5 3 0.17 0.50 | 0.33
4000 13.50 1 083 1.00 0.92
18 40 00 13 00 2 5 067 0.17 0.42
19 40.00 13.25 2 o 0.67 1.00 | 0.83
20 40.00 1333 1 0.83 1.00 1 092
21 40.00 12 50 1 2 0.83 0.67 0.75
22 40.00 1275 2 2 067 0.67 067
23 39 50 13.00 2 2 067 0.67 067





25 3950 1250 1 2 831 0.75
26 39 50 1400 3
I
1.00 1 050 75
27 39.50 1450 1 4 083 0.33 1 058
28 39.50 15 00 6 o 0.00 j 1.00 1 50
29 39 50 1200 1 3 i 083 050 067
30 40.00 12 00 1 2 I 083 | 0.67 | 0.75
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APPENDIX A
RESULTS OF SIMULATION RUNS
HUfi LQGAI ON BESULI
"BM's thai
£ I I
Lat(N) Long(E) (Nrofl proceed to cities)
Rome j Naples \ i
31 40 00 14.00 1.00 0.83 0.92
32 39 00 12.00 1 4
i
083 0.33 058
33 39.00 1250 3 1.00 0.50 0.75
34 39.00 13 00 1 5 083 0.17 0.50
35 39.00 13.50 2 1.00 0.67 0.83
36
37
39.00 14 00 4 0.33 1.00 0.67
39.00 14.50 6 0.00 1.00 0.50
38 39.00 15.00 6 1 0.00 0.83 0.42
39 40 00 1450 1
1 i
063 1.00 0.92
40 40.00 15.00 083 083 0.83
41 39 00 11.50 6 1.00 0.00 0.50
42 38.50 11.50 6 6 0.00 0.00 0.00





44 38.50 12.50 6 i ! 0.00 | 0.50 025
45 38 50 13 00 6 0.00 ! 1.00 I 0.50
46 38 50 13 50 6 0.00 1.00 050
47 38 50 1400 6 1 0.00 ! 083 042
48 38 50 14 50 8 0.00 1.00 0.50
49 38 50 1500 6 1 0.00 0.83 042
50 40.25 1425 1.00 1.00 100
51 40 25 11.75 1 2 0.63 0.67 075
52 40.00 11.50 1 6 0.83 0.00 0.42
53 39.50 11.50 6 0.00 1.00 0.50
54 3975 1425 1.00 100 1.00
55 3975 1375





57 3975 1275 3 1.00 50 75
58 39.75 1225 1 3 0.83 0.50 | 067
59 40.50 1400 1.00 1.00 1.00











RESULTS OF MONTE CARLO TRIALS OF PREFERRED SHIP POSITIONS
10
EXP VALcity = (£ TBM hitscity (n)) / 10
72 = 1
10
SAMPLE VAR = (^ (Nr TBM hitscity {n) - EXP VALcity ) 2 ) / 9
72 = 1
Standard e of EST EXP VALcity = jVARcity / /TO
Pi(INDIV TBM KILLcity ) =
10
! Y, ( Nl °f TBMS filedcity - Nr °f TBM hitScity) (^) ) / 60
72 = 1
AVE'[Pi ( INDIV TBM KILL ) ] =
(PrilNDIV TBM KILLRome ) + Pi (INDIV TBM KILLNaples ) ) / 2
n = replication ni
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APPENDIX B
RESULTS OF MONTE CARLO TRIALS OF PREFERRED SHIP POSITIONS
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APPENDIX B
RESULTS OF MONTE CARLO TRIALS OF PREFERRED SHIP POSITIONS
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CALCULATION OF TBM HIT PROBABILITIES
POS PrfTBMHrO Pr(Zero Pr{One PrfTWo PrfTwo or fewer
Rome Naples TBM hits) TBM hh) TBM hits) TBM hits)
4 003 0.08 051 - 0.36 0.06 0.92
5 0.28 020 0.04 0.14 0.15 033
9 005 005 054 0.34 0.06 094
10 0.05 0.05 0.54 0.34 006 0.94
11 022 022 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.39
12 025 025 003 0.13 0.15 0.31
13 0.30 0.13 0.05 018 0.15 0.38
14 053 053 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
15 023 0.23 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.38
17 0.03 0.03 0.69 26 0.03 0.98
19 0.07 0.07 0.42 036 0.10 0.90
20 0.07 0.07 0.42 0.38 0.10 0.90
21 022 022 0.05 017 0.17 0.39
22 022 022 005 0.17 0.17 0.39
23 038 038 0.00 0.02 0.05 008
24 038 038 0.GC 0.02 0.05 0.08
25 028 028 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.23
26 027 027 002 0.10 013 0.26
29 0.52 052 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
30 037 0.37 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.09
31 0.07 007 0.42 036 0.10 0.90
33 0.52 52 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
35 045 045 000 001 0.02 0.03
39 0.07 0.07 0.42 0.30 0.10 0.90
40 0.12 012 022 035 0.17 0.74
51 0.38 038 0.00 0.02 0.05 008
54 005 005 0.54 034 0.06 0.94
55 005 005 054 0.34 0.06 0.94
56 013 013 019 034 018 070
57 042 0.42 0.00 001 0.03 0.05
58 0.40 0.4 000 002 0.04 0.08
59 0.05 0.05 054 0.34 006 0.94
60 005 005 054 0.34 0.06 0.94
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